Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2003

Linda R. Acosta v. Salt Lake Regional Medical
Center and Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., American
ManufacturersMutual Ins., Sentry Insurance, and
Workers Compensation Fund : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Richard Burke; King, Burke and Schaap; attorney for petitioner.
Michael E. Dyer, Kristy L. Bertelsen; Blackburn and Stoll; attorneys for respondent.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Acosta v. Salt Lake Regional, No. 20030907 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2003).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/4623

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

Richard R. Burke, #6843
KING, BURKE & SCHAAP, P.C.
Attorneys for Petitioner
648 East 100 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 532-1700
Facsimile: (801)532-1780

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH

LINDA R. ACOSTA,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.
SALT LAKE REGIONAL MEDICAL
CENTER and LIBERTY MUTUAL
INS. CO., AMERICAN
MANUFACTURERS MUTUAL
INS., SENTRY INSURANCE,
& WORKERS COMPENSATION
FUND,
Defendants/Appellees.

Trial Court No. 2002959
Appellate No. 20030907-CA

ORAL ARGUMENT IS REQUESTED

P&uteteeStagg
Cterit of the Court

Richard R. Burke, #6843
KING, BURKE & SCHAAP, P.C.
Attorneys for Petitioner
648 East 100 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 532-1700
Facsimile: (801)532-1780

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH

LINDA R. ACOSTA,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.
SALT LAKE REGIONAL MEDICAL
CENTER and LIBERTY MUTUAL
INS. CO., AMERICAN
MANUFACTURERS MUTUAL
INS., SENTRY INSURANCE,
& WORKERS COMPENSATION
FUND,
Defendants/Appellees.

Trial Court No. 2002959
Appellate No. 20030907-CA

ORAL ARGUMENT IS REQUESTED

Richard R. Burke
KING, BURKE & SCHAAP, P.C.
648 East 100 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102

Alan Hennebold
LABOR COMMISSION OF UTAH
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

Elliot Morris
Workers Compensation Fund
392 East 6400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107

Theodore E. Kanell
PLANT, WALLACE,
CHRISTENSEN & KANELL
136 East South Temple, #1700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Michael E. Dyer
BLACKBURN & STOLL, LC
77 West 200 South, #400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

u

INTRODUCTION
This Court should reverse the Labor Commission's Order, and hold that Ms.
Acosta had no duty to simultaneously file her occupational disease claim with her
industrial accident claim. The Utah legislature has purposely kept these causes of
action separate, along with maintaining separate requirements for each, and
providing for separate compensation. The statute does not require injured workers
to simultaneously file these claims. The Labor Commission failed to recognize
that these claims are separate, and dismissed Ms. Acosta's occupational disease
claim based on the doctrine of claim preclusion. Claim preclusion does not bar
litigation of separate unlitigated claims that arise from separate statutes. This
Court should reverse the Labor Commission, and remand Ms. Acosta's
occupational claim for a hearing on the merits.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction

iii

Table of Contents

iv

Table of Authorities

v

Statement of Jurisdiction

vi

Statement of the Issue

vi

Standard of Review

vii

Provisions, Statutes, Ordinances and Rules

vii

Statement of the Case

vii

Facts

x

Summary of Argument

xii

Argument

1

Conclusion

16

Certificate of Service

17

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(c), (d), and (e)

vi

Questar Pipeline Co. v. State Tax Comm 'n, 817 P.2d 316 (Utah 1991)

vii

Utah Code Ann. § 34A-3-101, et. seq

vii, xii, xiii, 4, 7, 8, 15

Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-101, et. seq

vii, viii, ix, xii, xiii, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 15

Maoris & Assoc, v. Neways, Inc., 2000 UT 93, 16 P.3d 1214

3, 11, 13

Young v. Salt Lake City, 97 Utah 123, 90 P.2d 174 (Utah 1939)

4

Masich v. United States Smelting, Refining & Mining Co., 113 Utah 101, 191 P.2d
612 (Utah 1948)

4

SMP v. Kirkland, Inc., 843 P.2d 531, 533 (Utah App. 1992)

5

Tipler v. E.I. duPont deNemours and Co., 443 F. 2d 125 (1971)

6

Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Industrial Comm 'n, 115 Utah 451, 205 P.2d 541
(1949)

8

Tisco Intermountain & State Ins. Fund v. Industrial Comm 'n, 744 P.2d 1340 (Utah
1987)

8

Vigos v. MountainlandBuilders, Inc., 993 P.2d 207, 213 (Utah 2000)

12

Jacobs v. Teledyne, Inc., 529 N.E.2d 1255, (Ohio 1988)

14

v

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction to hear Ms. Acosta's appeal because the Labor
Commission has not decided all of the issues requiring resolution, namely, Ms.
Acosta's occupational disease claim. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(c). This
Court also has jurisdiction to hear this appeal because the Labor Commission has
erroronously interpreted or applied the law in denying Ms. Acosta's occupational
disease claim. Id. at § 16(4)(d). Finally, this Court also has jurisdiction to hear
Ms. Acosta's appeal because the Labor Commission has engaged in an unlawful
procedure or decision making process or has failed to follow prescribed procedure,
to the extent it has determined as a matter of Labor Commission policy that
occupational disease claims must be filed simultaneously with industrial accident
claims when they apply to the same employer. Id. at § 16(4)(e).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
The issue in this case is whether an unlitigated claim for occupational
disease, which arose under a separate statute, based on previously unlitigated
material facts, and which was filed within the appropriate statute of limitations,
was erroneously dismissed under the judicial doctrine of res judicata.

vi

STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court should review the Labor Commission's Order under a correction
of error standard because it is a question of general law and the agency's decision
making or procedure. Questar Pipeline Co. v. State Tax Comm 'n. 817 P.2d 316
(Utah 1991). In that case, the Supreme Court stated that under UAPA, "agency
determinations of general law . . . are to be reviewed under a correction of error
standard, giving no deference to the agency's decision." Id. at 317. This Court
should give no deference to the Labor Commission's decision because it is simply
the agency's interpretation of general law.
PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-3-101, et. seq., "The Utah Occupational Disease
Act,"orthe"UODA."
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-101, et. seq., "The Utah Workers' Compensation
Act,"orthe"UWCA."
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petitioner/Appellant, Ms. Linda Ms. Acosta, worked for Salt Lake Regional
Medical Center ("SLRMC") for approximately eighteen years from December,
1980 through December, 1998. On approximately December 20, 1998, Ms.
vii

Acosta was lifting a baby out of an isolet to hand to its mother, when she
experienced sudden, severe low back pain. Ms. Acosta filed an Application for
Hearing with the Labor Commission for workers compensation benefits arising
out of the December, 1998 industrial accident. The medical evidence adduced
during the proceeding demonstrated that Ms. Acosta likely had pre-existing
degenerative changes before her December 20, 1998 lifting event, although her
low back was asymptomatic. At a hearing, the ALJ found that Ms. Acosta
sustained an accident under a cumulative trauma theory of industrial accident.
On appeal, the Labor Commission determined that because the cumulative
trauma theory had not been plead, that the ALJ was barred from raising it sua
sponte as a theory of recovery. The Labor Commission also held that Ms. Acosta
was subject to the heightened standard of legal causation because she had an
asymptomatic pre-existing condition. On appeal to this Court, this Court affirmed
that the higher standard of causation applied to Ms. Acosta, and upheld the
Commission's denial of compensation for industrial accident.
On approximately August, 2002, Ms. Acosta filed a new Application for
Hearing alleging injury by occupational disease under the Utah Occupational

viii

Disease Act.1 Ms. Acosta alleged different material facts than she plead in her
industrial accident Application. She also alleged that those activities occurred
over her eighteen years of employment with SLRMC. SLRMC filed a Motion to
Dismiss Ms. Acosta's occupational disease claim, and the ALJ granted its Motion.
Petitioner appealed her denial of occupational disease claim to the Labor
Commission, and the Commission denied Ms. Acosta's Motion for Review. The
Commission held that Ms. Acosta's claims were bai u\i In the claim preclusion
branch of the doctrine of res judicata. The < 0111 mission also held that applying
the doctrine of claim preclusion served important public objectives that were
(apparently) more important than liberally construing the Act in favor of providing
compensation to injured workers. Ms. Acosta now appeals from the Labor
Commission's Order Denying her Motion for Review.

1

Ms. Acosta also alleged injury by accident under a cumulative trauma
claim. Ms. Acosta later elected not to pursue that claim, and it is not before this
Court.
IX

FACTS
On or around 3/26/99, Petitioner filed an Application for Hearing for
an industrial injury, she experienced at Salt Lake Regional Hospital
on 12/20/98. The Application stated "I was lifting a baby out of an
isolet to hand it to it's mother." See. Industrial Accident
Application for Hearing, (Aplt App. at 1).
On 2/25/99, Dr. Fotheringham examined Ms. Acosta on behalf of
Respondents. Dr. Fotheringham stated that her 12/20/98 work injury
"caused her current work symptoms," but noted that Ms. Acosta had
significant pre-existing degeneration that contributed to her problems.
MREat55 (Aplt App. at 29).
On 3/5/99, Dr. Robert Hood opined that Ms. Acosta had no prior
history of low back problems until her 12/20/98 work injury, and that
Ms. Acosta had significant pre-existing stenosis that contributed to
her problems. MRE at 58-9 (Aplt App. at 14-15).
On 10/22/99, the ALJ entered his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law and Order awarding Workers Compensation benefits.
On 11/17/99, Respondents filed a Motion for Review with the Labor
x

Commission.
6.

On 1/31/00, the Labor Commission issued a Order Granting
Respondents Motion for Review, and reversed the ALJ's award of
benefits to Petitioner.

7.

Petitioner appealed the Commission's Order to the Court of Appeals.

8.

The Court of Appeals upheld the Labor Commission's denial of
benefits. The Utah Supreme Court denied Petitioner's request for
writ of certiorari.

9.

On or mom hi 8/26/02, Ms. Acosta filed a new Application for
Hearing alleging injury by occupational disease. Ms. Acosta alleged
that she was "lifting babies, assisting patients with activities of
living, picking items up from the floor, and other activities." Ms.
Acosta also alleged that this occurred over eighteen years of work
with Respondents, from approximately 12/80

12/20/98. See,

Application for Hearing, Occupational Disease (Aplt App at (>).
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court should reverse the Labor Commission and remand Ms. Acosta's
occupational disease claim for a hearing on the merits. The Labor Commission
errorounsly applied the doctrine of claimed preclusion to bar Ms. Acosta's
occupational disease claim, because it believed that the Workers Compensation
Act, and the Occupational Disease Act created only a single cause of action. Res
judicata not only bars prelitigation of previously litgated claims, that arose from
the same material facts. Ms. Acosta's occupational disease claim was not subject
to claimed preclusion because it had not been litigated, and did arise from the
same material facts as her industrial accident. Utah law has always recognized
that occupational disease claims are different from industrial accident claims. The
Labor Commission treated these separate Acts as a single cause of action, and
wrongly held that Ms. Acosta should have filed her occupational disease claim
along with her industrial accident claim. Neither Act required Acosta to
simultaneously file her claims. The Labor Commission collapsed the dual
requirements under the Maoris & Associates case into a single requirement,
contrary to establish law. The Labor Commission admitted plain legal error when

xii

it upheld the dismissal of Ms. Acosta's occupational disease claim. Also, public
policy favors treating the Acts separately, and to liberally construe Ms. Acosta's
facts in favor of finding compensation.

xiii

ARGUMENT
MS. ACOSTA'S OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE CLAIM WAS A
DIFFERENT CLAIM FROM HER INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT CLAIM
BECAUSE IT AROSE FROM A SEPARATE STATUTES WITH
DIFFERENT REQUIREMENTS AND DIFFERENT COMPENSATION
PAYABLE. AND THEREFORE WAS NOT BARRED BY THE
DOCTRINE OF CLAIM PRECLUSION.
This Court should find that Ms. Acosta's occupational disease claim is not
barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion because her occupational disease claim
was a different unlitigated claim from her industrial accident claim. The Labor
Commission failed to recognize that occupational disease claims and industrial
accidents arise from different statutes, with different requirements. The
Commissions's failure to recognize the differences between the two claims led it
to erroneously apply the doctrine of res judicata to bar Ms. Acosta's claims.
Both the occupational disease act and the workers compensation act are
statutory creations, and neither statute required injured workers to simultaneously
file disease and accident claims against the same employer. Nor did claim
preclusion bar Ms. Acosta's occupational disease claim because her claim did not
arise out of the "same transaction or occurrence" as her industrial accident. To the
contrary, Ms. Acosta's occupational disease claim arose under a separate statute
with different material facts. Claim preclusion does not bar previously unlitigated

claims that arose under different statutes with different material facts. Therefore,
this Court should remand Ms. Acosta's case to the Labor Commission for a
hearing on the merits.
A.

Res Judicata Only Bars Relitigation of Previously Litigated Claims
Arising Out of the Same Material Facts.

Generally, res judicata is judicially created doctrine that bars litigants from
presenting the same claims or issues more than once. When applicable, the
doctrine may bar either previously litigated claims or issues:
Although the term "res judicata" is often used to describe
the overall doctrine of preclusion, a distinction should
properly be made between that branch of the doctrine
which precludes the relitigation of previously decided
claims, called either res judicata or claim preclusion, and
that branch which precludes the relitigation of previously
decided issues, known as either collateral estoppel.2
In this case, the Commission concluded that Ms. Acosta's occupational disease
claim was barred by res judicata or claim preclusion,3 and denied her occupational
disease claim without a hearing on its merits.

2

Career Serv. Rev. Bd. v. Dept ofCorr.. 942 P.2D 936, 938 n.2 (citing
Noble v. Noble. 761 P.2d 1369, 1374 n. 5 (Utah 1988).
3

Respondent's Motion to Dismiss Applications for Hearing, at 3,
Appellate App. at 33.
2

R

Ms. Acosta's Occupational Disease Claim Was Not Barred Because
The Claim Preclusion Requirements Were Not Satisfied.

Ms. Acosta's occupational disease claim may proceed because her case did
not satisfy the claim preclusion requirements. The Utah Supreme Court recently
articulated the three claim preclusion requirements:
First, both cases must involve the same parties or their
privies. Second, the claim that is alleged to be barred
must have been presented in the first suit or must be
one that could and should have been raised in the
first action. Third, the first suit must have resulted in a
final judgment on the merits.
Maoris & Assoc, v. Neways. Inc.. 2000 UT 93, 16 P.3d 1214 (emphasis added).
The second requirement is also known as the "same claim" requirement. The
"same claim" requirement can be satisfied in one of two ways: 1) by presenting the
claim in the first hearing; or 2) if the claim "must" be one that both could have
been raised, and should have been raised in the first hearing. Ms. Acosta did not
present an occupational disease claim at the first hearing, therefore, her claim may
only be barred now if she both "could have" and "should have" been raised at the
first hearing. Ms. Acosta's occupational disease claim may proceed unless
Appellees can demonstrate that her claims met the "same claim" requirement.

3

C

Occupational Disease Claims Have Always Been Recognized As
Different From Industrial Accident Claims* And Are Not the "Same
Claim."

Utah law has always recognized that occupational disease claims and
industrial accident claims are wholly different claims. After passing the UWCA in
1917, injuries from industrial accidents were no longer governed by common law.
Instead, industrial accident claims were the exclusive remedy for all accidental
injuries between employees and their employers. Utah Courts recognized that
only industrial accident claims were covered under the Act. In contrast,
occupational disease claims were still common law claims that had to be brought
in district court; the Industrial Commission had no jurisdiction over occupational
disease claims. See, e.g., Young v. Salt Lake City, 97 Utah 123, 90 P.2d 174 (Utah
1939) (holding lead poisoning from inhaling vaporized paint was occupational
disease, thereby depriving Industrial Commission of jurisdiction over common law
claim.)
After the Utah legislature created the Utah Occupational Disease Act
("UODA") in 1943, however, common law occupational disease claims ceased to
exist. See, e.g., Masich v. United States Smelting, Refining & Mining Co., 113
Utah 101, 191 P.2d 612 (Utah 1948) (holding common law occupational disease
4

claims abrogated by statutory occupational disease claims under UODA). History
shows that even before occupational disease claims were codified in 1943, Utah
law always recognized that occupational disease claims were different from
industrial accident claims. Occupational disease claims have never been
considered the "same claims" as industrial accident claims.
IX

Ms. Acosta Had No Duty To Simultaneouly File Different Claims
Where Different Statutes Gave Rise To Different Causes Of Action.

Ms. Acosta had no duty to file her occupational disease claim when she
filed her industrial accident claim. There is no duty to simultaneously bring
different claims that arise under different statutes. For example, in SMP v.
Kirkland, Inc., 843 P.2d 531, 533 (Utah App. 1992), the doctrine of res judicata
did not bar an employee from filing a later contractual offset claim arising under
different statute. This Court reasoned that because "the claim adjudicated before
the Industrial Commission was Kirkman's [claim for back wages] [while] [t]he
claim adjudicated by the circuit court was SMP's [contractual offset claim]. It is
readily apparent that the claims were not identical." Id. at 533. The claims were
not identical because they arose under separate statutes with different
requirements. Similarly, this Court should permit Ms. Acosta to bring her

5

occupational disease claim separately because it arose under a different statute
with different requirements.
Other courts have looked to the meaning and purpose of the statute in
permitting separate statutory causes of action to proceed in different cases. For
example, in Tipler v. E.I. duPont deNemours and Co., 443 F. 2d 125 (1971), an
employee who litigated a wrongful termination claim was not barred from
bringing a later claim that alleged discharge for discrimination, because the second
claim arose under a different statute. The court reasoned that the separate statutes
that prevented wrongful termination and discrimination were separate causes of
action with separate requirements that served distinct and important public
purposes. Id. It is well settled that claims arising under separate statutes need not
be filed simultaneously where each statute requires separate material facts to state
a claim.
The same is true for Ms. Acosta: her separate occupational disease claim
that arose out of a different statute and under different material facts was not
barred by res judicata. In other words, the legislature has chosen to separate
industrial accident claims and occupational disease claims, creating different
requirements and different compensation for each cause of action; the Labor
6

Commission may not simply ignore the Legislature's decisions, and treat both
Acts as giving rise to a single cause of action.
R.

Neither Statute Required Injured Workers To Simultaneously File
Occupational Disease Claims And Industrial Accident Claims.

Neither the Occupational Disease Act,4 nor the Workers' Compensation
Act5 required injured workers to simultaneously bring both occupational disease
and industrial accident claims. It is well settled that both Acts are governed by the
language of their statutes, and the Commission is bound by the language contained
in the Acts. The language of the Acts demonstrate that the legislature intended to
keep the actions separate.
The legislature has determined that industrial accidents occur at a discrete
time and place, while occupational diseases occur gradually over time, such as

4

See generally, Utah Occupational Disease Act, Utah Code Ann. §§
34A-3-101toll2.
5

See generally. Utah Workers' Compensation Act, Utah Code Ann. §§
34A-2-101,et. seq.
7

silicosis6 and asbestosis.7 The reporting requirements are different for industrial
accidents and occupational diseases.8 Employer liability requirements are
different for occupational diseases than industrial accidents.9 Benefits are
statutorily apportioned for occupational diseases,10 but not for industrial accident
claims. Occupational disease and industrial accident claims are disjunctive claims,
and can not arise from the same material facts. Applicants are specifically barred
from recovering for both industrial accident and occupational disease claims.11
The statute bars one set of operative facts from giving rise to an injury that is both
occupational disease and an industrial accident. Finally, neither act requires that
injured workers simultaneously file occupational disease claims with industrial
accident claims. Given the legislature's efforts to maintain separate requirements

6

See, e.g., Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n. 115 Utah
451,205P.2d541 (1949).
7

See, e.g., Tisco Intermountain & State Ins. Fund v. Industrial
Comm'iL 744 P.2d 1340 (Utah 1987).
8

Compare Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-407 with § 34A-3-108.

9

Utah Code Ann. § 34A-3-105.

10

Utah Code Ann. § 34A-3-110.

11

Utah Code Ann. § 34-A-3-110(3).
8

and benefits for each type of claim, there was no statutory support for the
Commission's conclusion that Ms. Acosta's occupational disease claim could have
and should have been raised in her first application for hearing.
R

The Labor Commission's "Practices and Customs" Of Filing
Alternative Claims Were Permissive. And Not Mandatory. And Did
Not Justify Ms. Acosta's Dismissal On The Merits.
» '

"

.

' '

i.

I,

The Labor Commission's application for hearing forms did not permit
alternative pleading when Ms. Acosta filed her first application. Ms. Acosta's
application for hearing ("Form 001") was for "industrial accidents" only, not
occupational diseases. Aplt. App. at 1. On its face, Form 001 did not permit
injured workers to make alternative claims.12 The Commission nonetheless argued
that it had a "custom and practice" of permitting injured workers to make
alternative claims for diseases and accidents.13 Order at 3. Aplt. App. at 117. But
even if there was an unarticulated practice of letting injured workers maintain
alternative claims, it did not justify mandatory dismissal when Ms. Acosta filed

12

In July, 2001, over a year and a half after Ms. Acosta's first filing, the
Commission revised its Form 001 to permit both industrial accidents and
occupational diseases to be simultaneously plead. Aplt. App. at 9.
13

Apparently, this custom would only be available to those injured
workers who knew they should ignore the restrictions on the Commission's forms.
9

her claim separately. The Commission's own forms did not permit alternative
pleading, and there was no notice that failure to make alternative arguments would
result in dismissal on the merits. There was no such requirement in the statutes or
in the Commission's own rules, nor was it found on the Commission's own forms.
G.

Contrary to Utah Law. The Commission's Decision Erroneously
Collapsed The "Could Have" and "Should Have" Requirements Into
A Single "Could Have" Requirement.

The Commission erroneously concluded that Ms. Acosta "should have"
filed her occupational disease claim simply because she "could have" filed it
earlier. Although the case law required the Commission to demonstrate that Ms.
Acosta both "could have" and "should have" filed her occupational disease claim
to later bar the claim under a claim preclusion theory, the Commission collapsed
its analysis to a single "could have" requirement:
In this case, Ms. Acosta had the opportunity in the first
adjudicative proceeding to present all theories she
believed supported her claim for benefits. She is not
entitled to pursue her claim for benefits "through
piecemeal litigation, offering one theory to the court
while holding others in reserve."
Order at 3. Aplt. App. at 117. In other words, because she "could have" raised
her occupational disease claim earlier, she should have done so.

10

(11c ( \ >ni n 11ssio11 pIainly ignoi ed tl :ie "shoi lid 1 lave" reqi lirement i iiider
Maoris & Assoc. 2000 UT at 93, 16 P.3d at 1214. But Ms. Acosta only "should
have" earlier plead an occupational disease if that claim arose out of the same
material facts, or if there was a statutory requirement to do so. As shown above,
Ms. Acosta's claims arose from different material facts: Ms. Acosta did not need
to raise her occupational disease claim where she had not plead facts that would
give rise to an occ upatioi lal disease claii i i M.oreov ei , tl lei e \ v as no statutory,
regulatory, or of 11<; i I .11 Mi ' 11111 n 11 ,s in11 i aj11irement that T\ Is \ costa
simultaneously plead all possible claims. The Labor Commission's failure to
analyze the "should have" requirement for claim preclusion demonstrated that it
failed to properly apply the law in dismissing Ms. Acosta's case. This Court
should find that Ms. Acosta had no duty to simultaneously file her occupational
disease claim along with her industrial accident claim.

11

H.

This Court Should Hold That Ms. Acosta Had No Duty To File Her
Occupational Disease Claim When She Filed Her Industrial Accident
Claim And That Claim Preclusion Did Not Apply To Her Facts. But
That Even If It Did, Public Policy Requires The Commission To
Liberally Construe Ms. Acosta's Case In Favor Of Finding
Compensation.

This Court should hold that Ms. Acosta had no duty to file her separate
occupational disease claim when she filed her industrial accident claim. The
legislature chose to create two separate causes of action for work injuries occupational diseases and industrial accidents - with separate requirements and
separate compensation. Until and unless the legislature creates a single statute for
work injuries, or otherwise subsumes these separate statutes, the Commission can
not treat these claims as a single cause of action. This Court should interpret these
Acts consistent with Utah's stated public policies that favor liberal construction to
provide compensation for injured workers.14 As separate causes of action, there
was no basis for the Commission to apply claim preclusion, and this Court should
remand Ms. Acosta's claim to the Commission for a hearing on the merits.

14

See. Vigos v. MountainlandBuilders, Inc.. 993 P.2d 207, 213 (Utah
2000) ("The purpose of the Act is to provide relief from industrial accidents. To
that end, we construe the Act liberally and in favor of coverage if the statutes
reasonably permit.")(internal citations omitted).
12

Bi it even i:l 'claii i i preclusioi i coi ild apj:: 1) tc Ms \ c -osta's facts, this Coi irt
should find that it did not. This Court should apply the test set forth in Maoris &
Assoc, and hold that Ms. Acosta had no duty to filed her occupational disease
claim when she filed her industrial accident claim. She "should [not] have" filed
an occupational disease claim because that claim arose from separate material
facts, apart from her industrial accident claim.
Ms. Acosta's facts demonstrate tl mt il woi ild be ui iji :is1 1 .0 appl> elan n
preclusion to bar 1 ler occupational disease claim. •' \ • \ -

•

* as exan lined

Ms. Acosta case attributed her injuries to her woik wiin appellees.15 The AJUJ ui
her industrial accident case awarded benefits based on cumulative trauma, but the
Commission reversed because Ms. Acosta had not articulated that specific theory
of industrial accident - not because her injuries were unrelated to her work with
Appellees. Ms. Acosta's facts demonstrate the importance of fulfilling the public
policy and purpose of the workers compensation statutes, rather tllan adhering to
technical

'

;

serve 01

f

off clair^ r 10' ^-\•!••••. -v -

'-13.

Acosta's case should be decided on its merits, and not dismissed on a technicality.

Facts Tjf 2-3.
13

The case law demonstrates that res judicata should not be applied when it
thwarts public policy. For example, in Jacobs v. Teledyne, Inc.,™ the Ohio
Supreme Court held that res judicata should be rejected when its application
would contravene overriding public policy or result in manifest injustice. In that
case, an applicant who applied for total disability benefits from silicosis and was
denied, was not later barred from presenting the same claim where his condition
had materially worsened. The Court emphasized the important public policy
underlying its workers compensation statutes, and refused to apply res judicata to
bar the applicants' claim:
[Fundamental fairness should dictate such a result.
While res judicata does apply to administrative
proceedings , it should be applied with flexibility. The
doctrine would be qualified or rejected when its
application would contravene an overriding public policy
or result in manifest injustice. . . . Fundamental fairness
requires that such a claim be determined on its facts, not
on legal technicalities. This result is consistent with this
state's public policy of construing the law liberally in
favor of injured employees.17

16

529 N.E.2d 1255, (Ohio 1988) (injured worker's previously
adjudicated claim for total disability for silicosis did not bar later claim for total
disability).
17

L± at 1259 (citations omitted).
14

Simpl)/ put, i ules of judi.ci.aJ coi isti i ictiol 11 i 11 ist > ield to the ii nportai it public policy
underlying the workers' compensatioi :i statutes. The interest in promoting judicial
economy by avoiding additional hearings is far outweighed by denying injured
workers lifetime benefits without a hearing on the merits of their claims.
The Commission did not weigh the interests at stake; it simply concluded
that claim preclusion served "vital public interests." Order at 4, Aplt. App. at 118.
The Commission concluded that its decision would "merely leqiine that parties
present all their available claim* ,tiul defenses at

OIH4

tune," even if il was nnl

required, by eithei ? \ ct I d. Wl lile this n lay be an admirable legislative goal, the
Commission is still bound by both Acts, and neither presently require mandatory
simultaneous filings as contemplated by the Commission. This Court should
reverse the Commission and hold that there is no simultaneous filing requirement,
and remand Ms. Acosta's claim to the Commission for a hearing on the merits.
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CONCLUSION
i nib Co\:- should reverse the Labor Commission, and remand Ms. Acosta's
occupational disease claim for a hearing on the merits. Occupational disease
claims are separate statutory creations from industrial accident claims. The
legislature has kept these claims separate and Ms. Acosta had no duty to
simultaneously file these claims. This Court should hold that as separate claims,
claim preclusion does not apply to , is. Acosta's facts.
preclu

••-.: apply, n \

to Ms. Av. -)sta's facts,

•:
these reasons, uii:•* *• •" ->'

-; • • -:\. . -

i. t

- AV

;!K . ••••-,

reverse

. ? .! JI

Commission, and remand Ms. Acosta's occupational disease claim to the
Commission for a hearing on the merits.
DATED this ^ f d a y of February, 2004.
KING, BURKE & SCHAAP. P.C.

Richard R. Burke
A ttorneys for Petitioner/Appellant
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